Separation Logic in Infer

Operational Semantics

How to establish memory model in the presence of pointers?

• By Hoare Triple

 $\{emp\}malloc()\{(ret \mapsto -) \lor (ret = nil \land emp)\}$ $\{x \mapsto -\}free(x)\{emp\}$ $\{x \mapsto -\land y = Y\}[x] := y\{x \mapsto Y \land y = Y\}$

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\{x \mapsto X\}\texttt{return}[x]\{x \mapsto X \land \texttt{ret} = X\}
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Basic Idea

- It analyzes programs by generating and composing function specifications in a bottom-up manner by means of bi-abduction. The specification of a function is a set of Hoare Tripes {{P} func() {Q}}, where P is the weakest pre-condition of the safe execution of the function func. A function and its callees are bug-free if its specification set is not empty, indicating that these functions are executed without bugs under some preconditions.
- How to achieve context sensitive?
 - The context-sensitivity is achieved by *inferPre* and *inferSpec* illustrated by Algorithm 4 and 5 in his paper of short version(POPL 2009). The inferred specifications of the callees are inlined to get the weakest precondition and postcondition of the caller.
- How to achieve path sensitive?
 - This work does not support path sensitivity thoroughly. If the branch condition occurs in the weakest precondition at the entry of the branch after the condition, the effect of the branch condition is considered by removing the conjunction from the formula to generate the better weakest precondition, like the following first example shows. Otherwise, the branch condition will be skipped, just as the second example shows. Because the precondition is not weakest anymore, this trick can cause false alarms when the failure in generating specifications of its caller arises.

An Example

Some Hoave Triples: $q_{\mu x}(e) \{ \leftarrow emp \land e = E \}$ int x = randow [); $\leftarrow emp \land e = E \land x = X$ HTI { um - A w= W} $u \rightarrow n = W;$ if (x > 0) shipped, unrelated to spec in $\boxed{1}$ {um- * um W / w= W} emp Ne=E N x=X (HTz) return e energiant Ar=EAx=XAvet=E. ro bi-ebduction HT2: Semp/DEE (vepresents empty heap) else return C; { vot emp / vet = E / e=E } return Oil Here, E and W are symbolic value of E emp A e=E A x=X A vet =0 3 & and Ow indicating that W and they are initialized. Obtained spec of qux(e): Semp re=E3 9 ux (e); Begin bottom-up analysis Semp Ne=EN x=XN (pet=0 Vret=E))

bav
$$(u, v)$$
 f
 $if(u!=v \& u!=o)$
 $w=qux(v);$
 $else$
 $w=o;$
 $u=o;$
 $u=v;$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=o.$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=o.$
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 $w=o.$
 $w=o.$
 $w=o.$
 $w=qux(v)$
 $w=o.$
 $w=o.$

Spec of bar:

$$\{e_{WP}, u = U \land v = V \land e_{W}, u \mapsto -\}$$

 $bar(u, v)$
 $\{e_{W}, u \mapsto - * u \mapsto u \land w = W \end{cases}$
 $\{A u = U \land v = V \land (w = o \lor W = V)\}$

<u>Remark 1</u>: branch condition (u!=v&u!=o) is the does not affect the precondition obtained by the approach.

The correctness of w=qux(v) and w=o do not rely on the branch condition.

is solved as un-

foo (p, 2) { [omp Ap-PAg=Q * ip-> abduct bar (p. 9); x=p=n. Similarly: The spec of for: @ {emp * p→- Ap=p Aq=Q} foo (p, 2); $\{e_{np} * p \rightarrow - * p \rightarrow_{n} W \land (x = W)$ $\Lambda P = P \Lambda Q = Q \Lambda (W = 0 V W = Q) } Port$ (x= e) A post is not valid, assert down't always hold

In this example, the specifications of functions are generated in a bottom-up manner, where the specification of the function is a collection of Hoare Triples $\{\{P\} fun() \{Q\}\}\}$. Specifically, P and Q are the weakest pre-condition and post-condition of func in safe executions. Meanwhile, The weakest precondition and postcondition of each statement can be obtained in this process, and they can be used to verify or invalidate the assertion. For example, the post-condition in the third

picture shows that the assert(x==q) does not hold for all the executions. This is consistent to the actural execution of the program.

However, the analysis degrades the precision of the specification of bar . The specification obtained in the first picture shows that the safe execution of qux does not rely on the branch condition. The heuristic trick handling paths of their approach ignore the effect of the branch conditions, so the post-condition of bar presumes the cases that v=v=w, which do not occur in the actural run.

Another issue is manual effort for terminality and avoiding explosive size of separation logic formulae. The statements in the forms of x - n = y and x = y - n increase the size of a logic formula in the presence of long and even unbounded program paths, such as loops and recursive functions. Specific folding rules are needed to eliminate variables in the formula. For example, ls(x, y) * ls(y, z) * ls(z, nil) is replaced by ls(x, nil) if ls(x, nil) = (x = nil) lor (lexists y, ls(x, y) * ls(y, nil)) is defined in the analysis of list manipulating programs. The folding rules differs for different data structures, and people need to write these rules for their programs.

Last by not least, except for the fragment of linked list [3], decision problem of general separation logic is not decidable [2]. The limitation of solvers makes the bi-aduction based approaches not strong as it would be, because some heuristics are introduced to assure that the analysis can terminate under its time setting.

Reference

[1] Calcagno C, Distefano D, O'hearn P W, et al. Compositional shape analysis by means of biabduction[J]. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2011, 58(6): 1-66.

[2] Berdine J, Calcagno C, O'hearn P W. Symbolic execution with separation logic[C]//Asian Symposium on Programming Languages and Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005: 52-68.

[3] J. Berdine, C. Calcagno, and P. W. O'Hearn. A decidable fragment of separation logic. In FSTTCS 2004, volume 3328 of LNCS, pages 97–109. Springer, Dec. 2004.